Monday, June 11, 2007

Cutting Your Way to Prosperity? (part 1)

THE STORY
A long time ago, I was in charge of creating the advertising media budget for a retail company. I turned in what I thought was a reasonable budget.

A couple of weeks after I turned in my budget, I got a call from the budget department. They said that when the budgets of all the departments were rolled up, the expenses were too high. They asked me if it would be okay for them to cut the advertising budget by 25%.

I said, “Before I answer that, let me ask you a question. If the advertising budget is cut by 25%, are you planning on cutting sales by any amount?”

They replied, “No, the sales budget would stay the same.”

In response, I said, “Well in that case, why don’t you make advertising $0? Obviously, you do not think that advertising has any impact on sales, so I suppose we shouldn’t do any advertising at all.”

THE ANALOGY
One of the hardest times to execute a strategy is when times get tough, such as in an economic downturn. To get through the tough times, there is often a need to cut expenses deeper than normal. There can be many problems if the cutting is done improperly. This is the first of a series of blogs on some of the pitfalls to avoid when cutting costs.

The first pitfall to avoid is in ignoring the interconnectivity of cost reduction decisions. If you cut costs in one area, it can make that area look good. However, due to interconnectivity, the impact of that reduction impacts other parts of the business. It may cause damage to other parts of your business which are worse than the benefits gained in the inital cuts, causing you to actually lose ground in your quest for profitability.

You may end up congratulating someone for their cuts, even though it is ruining the profit structure elsewhere. Take, for example, the story above. One could look like a hero for cutting advertising by 25%. It might cause the people in the advertising department to get a big bonus. However, if the reduction in advertising causes sales to drop too far, then you have rewarded people for destroying value.

In most cases, it is illogical to believe that one can just cut 25% of advertising and expect it to not impact sales at all. The overriding purpose for practically all advertising is to influence people to buy more from you. Advertising and sales are interconnected. To budget a huge drop in advertising without any drop in sales is to either admit that you are incompetent in your advertising or admit that your sales budget is an unrealistic lie.

THE PRINCIPLE
The principle of interconnectivity needs to be considered when implementing cost reduction programs. There are three main areas where interconnectivity can hurt you:

1) Vertical Connections
2) Horizontal Connections
3) Customer Connections

These are discussed more fully below:

1) Vertical Connections
An income statement has many lines on it. If you focus on just one line on the income statement, you can achieve huge cuts on that particular line. However, it may just serve to move those costs up or down the income statement to a different line. The lines on an income statement are interconnected.

For example, let’s say one is focused on cutting a department’s payroll expenses. There are many ways to achieve this. For example, one can outsource work which used to be done internally to an outside third party. The payroll line goes down, but the outside services line goes up. It may even go up faster than payroll goes down.

Another way to reduce payroll is to increase the use of temporary services. The work didn’t go away…it just went to a different line item. If the focus is on cutting headcount, it may result in increased overtime for the remaining workers.

If the focus is on cutting capital investments, there may be an increase in repairs and maintenance in order to keep the old capital running. Or if the repairs and maintenance are cut too far, as appears to have been the case at some BP refineries, you may end up with serious disasters of entire businesses going out of commission for a long period of time. That raises costs on all sorts of other lines.

The moral of the story: When looking at a department’s cost cutting efforts, do not focus too narrowly. Look at the impacts that a cut on one line could do the increasing a different line on that department’s income statement. Cuts on one line rarely fall 100% to the bottom line. Some of it leaks back to other lines. Capture the leakage in your estimates.

2) Horizontal Connections
Vertical connections tend to be easier to address, because the income statement can be contained within a single department. For example, if you tell the legal department to reduce their total costs, then they do not gain much when shifting internal legal personnel costs to outside legal counsel. Since they have responsibility for both lines, they do not shift their total expense much in shifting the burden from one line on their income statement to the other. Hence, there is not much incentive for making the shift.

The more difficult problem is when the connectivity is horizontal—between departments. If one can improve their department’s expenses by pushing costs to another department, it can make that department manager look good, because his or her area has permanently reduced their costs. Even though the total company expenses did not go down, the department that shift costs to another department can get undeservingly rewarded.

Let’s look at how this might play out in a retail company. The merchants might be able to lower their cost on the good they buy by requiring less of the vendors. They could ask the vendor to stop doing certain tasks in return for a lower price. Those tasks could include:

A) No longer having the vendor put price tags on the goods.
B) No longer having the vendor sort the goods by store before shipping them.
C) Shipping the goods all at once, rather than holding onto the inventory and shipping it in more manageable quantities.

While this takes costs off the merchandiser’s books, it adds a ton of costs to the retailer’s distribution center, because now they have to do what the vendor used to do. They have to do the sorting and the tagging. At the same time, the warehouse gets clogged with extra goods, making processing at the distribution center less efficient.

Now the distribution center may want to escape some of this problem by shifting the burden to the stores. They could send the goods to the stores untagged. They could clog the stores with more inventory than they need. So now, someone at the stores has to do more work than before.

Moral of the story: Don’t just accept a department giving a commitment that they will reduce their costs. Ask them how they are cutting their costs, so that you can determine if their method of cutting is just shifting the burden to another department.

3) Customer Connections
Some cuts in cost are noticeable to the potential customers. If your cost cuts make your firm less desirable to customers, they could end up going somewhere else. It does little good to cut costs if it results in alienating customers and eliminating sales. Long after the tough times are over, customers will remember how you treated them in the tough times and may not come back when the times are good.

Using a retail example again, one can cut labor in the stores in a way that:

1) Makes the store visually less desirable, because there is less cleaning and straightening up.
2) Make the checkout lines longer due to fewer people operating the cash registers.
3) Create more out-of-stocks, because there are fewer people restocking shelves.

These outcomes can cause customers to no longer want to shop your store. The drop in sales could be greater than the drop in costs.

Moral of the story: Don’t forget the customer perspective when cutting costs. Do the reductions in expenses exceed their impact on reducing sales?

SUMMARY
Just because one has a “successful” cost cutting plan put in place does not necessarily mean that total costs really went down all that much or that profitability of the entire company is better off. To really have success in tough times, one needs to check the interconnectivity of cost cutting actions, to make sure that costs were not merely shifted up and down a department’s income statement, or shifted to another department, or caused customers to stop patronizing your business.

FINAL THOUGHTS
I am not trying to imply that cost cutting is bad or unnecessary. Cost cutting is often necessary and good. We just cannot go around blindly believing that all cuts are good cuts. The next blog will address some of these issues around deciding what are good cuts.

Saturday, June 9, 2007

Sometimes, It’s Not Nice to Share

THE STORY
I’ve worked at several companies who have had a portfolio of retail businesses and decided to centralize most of the overhead of the divisions into corporate shared services. Although each company handled it slightly differently, they tended to follow a pattern something like this:

First, someone would get the notion that if you combine division level overhead to a corporate location, the company is better off. They make a case that:

A) The quality of expertise should go up due to specialization; and
B) Costs should go down due to eliminating duplication and through economies of scale.

They win the argument, so a corporate shared services area is set up. The people running these new shared services areas get fancy new titles and increases in their salaries. To justify their position, they create a bureaucracy to interact with the divisions. The bureaucracy, of course, requires additional people to do the interacting.

Not long thereafter, the divisions make three complaints about the shared services:

1) It takes longer to get anything done.
2) More time is wasted in meetings.
3) The quality of the output from the service is not as good as before.
4) It costs a lot more money.

The complaints are investigated and found to be true in many cases. As a result, the shared service programs are scaled back significantly or eliminated altogether. Then things return pretty much back to where they were before shared services, with the divisions running much more independently.

THE ANALOGY
Strategies often involve the building of a portfolio of businesses. Within such a strategy, it is common to build at least part of the portfolio via acquisitions. To help justify the high purchase prices for acquisitions, savings are factored into the financial model for the various economies of scale which are expected from combining the new business with the rest of the portfolio.

Unfortunately, it is commonly the case that after the acquisition occurs, the savings from combining the businesses turn out to be far less than what was put into the business plan. As a result, it soon becomes apparent that too much was paid for the acquisition. Now the acquiring company is faced with the reality of having of destroyed shareholder value, because they paid more for the company than they will get back in earnings/savings.

The problem is that combining certain overhead functions turns out to be counterproductive. As we saw in the story above, shared services in many cases can increase costs while reducing quality. It turns out that the number of areas which make sense to combine are far fewer than one would at first think.

Although we tell our children that “It is nice to share,” in the business world, it often makes more economic sense “not to share.” Therefore, when developing strategies, be careful not to rely too heavily on sharing of overhead to justify your tactics.

THE PRINCIPLE
What we are really talking about here are synergies. If we overestimate synergies, we can end up with a seriously flawed strategy—maybe flawed enough to destroy a company. In order to ensure that your strategy does not come de-railed by poor assumptions on synergies, three principles should be kept in mind.

1) Resource Vs. Outsource
2) Distinctive Vs. Distractive
3) Frozen Vs. Flexible

These three principles are discussed below.

1) Resource Vs. Outsource
Often times, aggressive synergistic models are based on an assumption that divisions will outsource a number of functions to corporate. Complete outsourcing is rarely cost effective because the division gives up too much control in a complete outsource. The divisions lose control over their destiny. It is difficult enough to execute a strategy when you control your functions. If you have outsourced your functions, then it can be like fighting two wars—one against the outside marketplace and an internal war with the shared service group.

Corporate may mean well, but when the entire function is outsourced, the division tends to get stuck with too much bureaucracy, too many costs, too much wasted time, and a product not always well suited to the unique needs of the division. Divisions tend to need functional people within the division to fight for what is right for the division.

Many times, one size does not fit all. A company in the incubator stage has different needs from a rapidly growing business or a mature business. Some divisions can afford more service than others. To put them through the same process would be like telling all women that they should be wearing a size 6 dress.

Rather than “outsourcing,” one should be looking at “resourcing.” There are many resources within the portfolio which can be shared between divisions. For example, one can share access to channels of distribution, knowledge about certain customer groups, patents, vendors, sales reps, intellectual property, employees, and so on.

For example, I have a friend who used to work at 3M. He says 3M often paid a premium to acquire a company just to get access to a patent which they knew could be valuable if spread across a few of their divisions. The deals worked based on the sharing value of the patent resource rather than imaginary synergies from outsourcing.

Resourcing does not require divisions to give up control of functions. Instead, it is a means to empower a division’s function to be better off than it was before. Whereas outsourcing is primarily taking away something from a division, resourcing is primarily giving something to a division. It is like sharing gifts at Christmas.

When looking at acquisitions, one is more likely to have success in reaping benefits if the benefits are based on understanding the value of specific resources which can be shared within the portfolio, rather than difficult-to-achieve synergies through generic centralization of complete functions through outsourcing.

2) Distinctive Vs. Distractive
Certain functions are core to the success of a business. They help provide the distinctiveness which ensures strategic success at the point of implementation. In retailing, one such core function is Advertising/Marketing. Marketing is how one communicates the strategy to the customer. Advertising decisions at most retailers tend to require input from many parts of the division under very short time-frames. It is a valuable tactical tool. To lose control of advertising would be to lose control of a key determinant of strategic and operational success.

Yet, on more than one occasion, I have seen marketing/advertising outsourced from a division into a corporate shared service program. Taking away a core function from a division can make them “average” at the point where they need to be “distinctive.” We have already talked about how outsourcing can lower productivity. In certain core areas, outsourcing can also make it nearly impossible to stay on-strategy.

By contrast, some functions tend to be business distractions. For example, issuing payroll checks rarely provides competitive distinction. It is just a distraction which needs to get done. If you can take away these distractions and centralize them, the division can focus on the more critical factors.

Core strategic functions which provide distinction need to be out in the field with the division on the front lines. Functions which provide no competitive leverage (distractions) can be placed at corporate. Different businesses may have different points of distinction and distration, so one needs to examine this on a case to case basis.

3) Frozen Vs. Flexible
One of the problems with too much integration of division functions with corporate is that portfolios are not frozen. New divisions are added over time, and old divisions are divested over time. If one tries to squeeze out too many synergies by tight intertangling of the divisions with each other and corporate, it becomes more difficult to maintain flexibility when it is time to divest one of the pieces. There is value to maintaining some of that flexibility. That value can be destroyed if synergies are attempted beyond the two points already mentioned.

Instead of tight intertangling, one can get some of the same benefits with standardization. For example, if every division uses basically the same standard software systems (on non-core processes) and the same standard language to talk about business, it is easy to share resources back and forth without having to be intertangled, because standardization breaks down the barriers to working together. Yet at the same time, it makes it easier to unfreeze the portfolio and divest of pieces, because they are not so intertwined.

SUMMARY
Making too aggressive an assumption on synergies can cause one to make the wrong strategic decisions. Subjecting divisions to overly aggressive outsourcing to corporate can end up counterproductive. To be safe, only take into account synergies regarding:

1) Resource Sharing
2) Non-Distinctive Functions
3) Those that still allow flexibility in adding to or subtracting from the portfolio.

FINAL THOUGHTS
Often, the problem with synergies is that they do not really exist in the first place. Not all business combinations make sense. Instead of 1+1=3, one can end up with 1+1=0.5. You cannot always blame the people executing the strategy when synergies to not live up to plans. Sometimes, the original design of the plan is wrong.

Wednesday, June 6, 2007

When You Think You’re Buying Low, The Seller Thinks He’s Selling High

THE STORY
I used to do mergers and acquisition work on a regular basis. At that time, I would frequently get from investment bankers books describing companies that were for sale. One time, I got a book on a franchise retailer who had number of stores in a couple of major markets in the United States. I opened up the book and quickly built a simple computer spreadsheet to roughly see how profitable this company was. It looked outstandingly profitable!

If you added the potential for national and international expansion, it looked even better. If we paid for it based on normal pricing multiples, we would make a fortune! This looked like a “can’t miss” deal—a no-brainer, as we called them. Any fool could see how good of a deal this was. It looked so positive, that I was tempted not to do a more detailed analysis—even if my assumptions were off by quite a bit, it would still look good. I got very excited, because you rarely see a deal that looked this exceptional.

But then I started thinking. If this was such a good business model, why is the owner selling? I went back to the book. It claimed that the business was for sale because the owners felt that its greatest value lay in its expansion potential. The book went on to say that the current owners believed that if the company was put into the hands of someone who was better capitalized, they could achieve that expansion potential better than the current owners. That sounded reasonable to me…until I looked up who the owners were.

One of the largest owners was a major investment banking company. In fact, it was the same company that had been contracted to sell the company. This investment banking company had full-time investment professionals and access to far more capital than the people it was trying to sell the company to. Something here didn’t smell right. If wealthy professional investors could not (or would not) fund this company, why should I? I was reminded of an old saying, “If a deal appears too good to be true, it probably is.”

So I investigated further. Buried deep into the book was a comment that most of the franchise agreements with the company were expiring over the next few years and that a significant percentage were refusing to renew their franchise. These franchisees claimed that they saw no benefit to being associated with this franchisor and were going to operate stores independently. This caused some concern. If the current franchisees were dissatisfied and not renewing, why would I think I could expand this concept nationally with new franchisees? Perhaps this chain is contracting, rather than expanding.

So I investigated further. Way back in the small footnotes was a comment that most of the store leases were coming to an end over the next few years and would have to be renegotiated. That didn’t bother me until I remembered that about 50 pages earlier in the book, the company bragged that one of its benefits was the unusually low rents it paid on its properties. In fact, it claimed that its leases were at only about 25% of current market rates. That got me thinking. When those leases get renegotiated, they will probably move a lot closer to market rates.

This caused me to go back and rerun the model on my spreadsheet, putting in less expansion and higher rents. This time, the model was highly unprofitable. You’d have to have been a fool to want to buy this company. The more you expanded it, the worse it looked. Suddenly, I understood why these professional investment bankers wanted to sell the company right away. Its current profitability was going to disappear in a couple of years. They were hoping to find a fool who would buy the company based on its current position rather than its future position. And I was nearly that fool.

THE ANALOGY
One of the key roles of strategic planning is to find ways to grow a company. Acquisitions are a popular tool for creating that growth. Therefore, it is very common to see acquisitions put into a company’s strategic plan.

Although it looks wonderful to put acquisitions into a planning document, it is a lot more difficult to actually make the acquisitions happen. First of all, acquisitions rarely come according to your schedule. For example, you may put in your plan that you will do a $20 million acquisition in the first half of the second year of your plan. But what if the deal really happens in year four? Or year one? Or not at all? What if the deal happens to be significantly larger or smaller than $20 million?

This brings us to the second major problem with putting acquisitions into strategic plans—most are failures. Depending on what study you look at, approximately 70% to 80% of acquisitions, on average, are failures. Had the company I worked for acquired that franchiser mentioned above, I am certain it would have been a failure. If so many acquisitions fail, then why do strategic plans typically assume that every acquisition in the plan are wildly profitable?

It is a lot like the stock market. Every day millions of shares trade hands. Nearly all the sellers are assuming that the price of the stock is going down while nearly all of the buyers are assuming that the price of the stock is going up. At least one of the two parties has to be wrong on every one of these millions of transactions.

I was initially excited about that franchise retailer, because I thought at first I was buying it at the bottom. It looked highly profitable and highly expandable. I thought I was getting in at the beginning of an upward ride to great wealth. However, as I examined it further, I realized that the sellers thought they were selling it at the top. They could see that rising costs and fewer franchisees were just around the corner and that everything was getting worse. The great ride was over and things were trending down. In this case, if a deal had occurred, I think the buyer would have been wrong and the seller right.

THE PRINCIPLE
Most aggressive companies have a gap between the goal of how large they want to be and how large the combination of their current businesses can get. To fill that gap, I have seen companies use unknown, miscellaneous acquisitions as a plug in their planning document.

In many cases, this can be a cowardly approach to planning. Rather than doing the hard work of detailing a specific path to fill the growth gap, these companies ignore the problem. They convince themselves that some mysterious acquisitions will solve all of their growth problems, so they don’t need to worry about it. Trust me…any growth gap should be worried about, because they are rarely easy to fill, even if you are filling them with acquisitions.

Because doing acquisitions well is so difficult, I have listed below four principles of acquisitions that I have learned over the years. Keep these in mind as you plan for and as you do acquisitions.

1. Have an answer for the 30% question
If you are acquiring a publicly traded company, a rule of thumb is that you will probably end up paying around a 20 to 30% premium over its current trading market value in order to get the deal done. In general, the current market value of a widely traded stock is a fair approximation of what a company is worth in the hands of its current management. Therefore, if you acquire a public company, you typically need to have a plan to operate the acquired company about 30% better than the current owners just to break even on your investment. If you want to create significant growth beyond breakeven, you need to do even better. Since privately held companies have access to sophisticated consultants, the astute ones will probably want a similar type of premium.

With such a high level of performance needed to make a typical acquisition work, it is no wonder that so many acquisitions fail. It is highly unlikely that you can manage their company under their strategy and do it 30% better than they can. The only way you can cover the 30% gap is if you can do something meaningfully different with the assets as you combine them with your assets. And that requires good up-front planning.

For most acquisitions to cover the 30% premium, there need to be significant synergies between the acquiring company and the acquired company. These synergies can come in many forms:

• Transfer of core competency, management, or operational strengths between companies (in either direction);
• Access to new products, services, technologies, patents, customers, distribution channels or geographies that can be improved by assets or competencies already owned by the acquiring company.
• Access to missing elements needed to reach your strategic direction faster or cheaper than creating it from scratch.

Strategic planning can help determine which types of synergies are most valuable to your company and thereby help direct your search to the acquisition targets where you are most likely able to cover the 30% premium.

Without synergies between the companies, you are nothing more than investment capital. The only value you bring is your money. It is hard to think that just by putting in your money, you can make the company 30% better. Besides, there are professional investment capital companies that do that type of investment on a full-time basis and are very good at it. They are probably the smartest pure money investors. If the deal is good enough on a pure money basis, they will probably get to the deal before you do. Beware of pure money deals that have been rejected by professional investment bankers.

2. Look for companies that are not for sale first
When an owner is actively trying to sell a company, he or she is sending a message of no longer wanting to be associated with company. That should make you suspicious of why you would want to be associated with that company.

Also, when a company is actively being sold, it is more likely that the company is being operated in a way that optimizes its salability, rather than longevity. For example, in order to make a company look good to a potential buyer, a company may do things to increase sales or profits in the immediate term. However, these activities may obligate the company to do things that are detrimental in the long-term. Be suspicious of any rapid recent improvements.

By contrast, if owners are not actively considering selling, then they are showing a commitment to the company. In addition, they are less likely to be operating the company in a way that compromises the company’s future.

3. Always ask the owner why they are willing to sell their company
You have a right to be suspicious whenever a company is willing to sell at the price you are willing to pay. After all, they know their company better than you do. And, as mentioned earlier, sellers want to sell at the top, not the bottom. So don’t be afraid to ask why they are willing to sell.

Some answers to this question are quite acceptable. For example, an older owner who has most of his or her assets tied to the company for sale may want to make his or her assets more diversified and more liquid for retirement or transfer of assets to children by selling to get cash or get stock in a larger company that is easier to sell in the market.

Another good answer would be if a company for sale is at a transition stage and the current owners feel that they are not best suited to operate during or after the transition. For example, some people may feel comfortable starting small companies, but not at running them when they become larger.

4. Unlink the goal from the path
Acquisitions are not the only way to achieve strategic synergies. One can often achieve the same goal via strategic partnerships, alliances, coalitions, consortia, joint ventures, internal start-ups, strategic hiring, or outsourcing. Often, these alternatives can be a more cost effective or less risky way to achieve these goals as compared to acquisitions. By unlinking the goal (the strategic synergy) from the path (acquisition) one is freed up to look at more alternatives. Don’t automatically assume that acquisitions are your only alternative.

SUMMARY
Success in acquisitions is difficult. When you think you are buying low, the seller thinks he or she is selling high. To reduce the risk of failure in acquisitions, keep in mind the following principles:

1. Have an answer for the 30% question
2. Look for companies that are not for sale first
3. Always ask the owner why they are willing to sell their company
4. Unlink the goal from the path

FINAL THOUGHTS
Just because about 75% of all acquisitions fail does not mean you should completely avoid them. Consider your alternatives. Studies show that alliances have a similar failure rate, and new business start-ups fail about 80-90% of the time. If you do nothing, the effects of the changing environment will make your current strategic initiative eventually fail 100% of the time. Suddenly, acquisitions don’t look as bad an alternative.

Monday, June 4, 2007

There's More Than One Way to Slice a Pizza

THE PRINCIPLE
In the world of strategy, it is easy to get trapped by conventional wisdom. Certain industries tend to operate in certain ways, with most industry participants thinking about the business similarly. This includes thinking about what is being offered for sale, what are the most important features, how the product/service is pitched to the consumer, how it is priced/bundled, service levels, and so on.

With so much of the industry thinking along the same lines, one can start believing that this is the only way to run the business. We start narrowing the strategic options to one—the one that everyone else uses. If everyone is following a similar path, it is extremely difficult to break out of the pack and produce results above industry norms.

However, if one throws conventional wisdom out the window, a much wider range of possibilities become available to choose from. Better still, one can discover a position radically different from the status quo. This can create more distinction and differentiation for your brand, thereby increasing the preference for your brand and minimizing the threat of price wars.

EXAMPLE #1
Take, for example, coffee. It used to be that if you wanted to be a big player in the coffee business, you would use the following conventional wisdom:

• Sell coffee grounds in 3lb. cans.
• Sell the cans through supermarkets
• Use heavy promotions through coupons and the retail trade to try to get endcap displays in the supermarket at a hot price
• The key selling point was low price
• Consumers then make their own coffee for home consumption

Starbucks, however, threw away conventional wisdom and came up with an entirely different business model:

• Sell fully-prepared coffee, a cup at a time.
• Sell in special branded locations dedicated to coffee
• Have coffee consumed on-premise or in car via drive-up window
• Key selling points are quality, variety and atmosphere. The price of one cup can start to approach what people in the past used to pay for an entire can of coffee grounds.
• Provide internet service while enjoying the coffee.

Of course, neither Folgers nor Maxwell House came up with Starbucks. They were trapped by conventional wisdom. It took a relative outsider—unbounded by conventional thinking—to see the potential from looking at the situation differently.

EXAMPLE #2
However, the example which fascinates me the most is pizza. It’s just a little dough, a little sauce, a little topping, and a little cheese. Conventional wisdom is that you buy fresh, hot round pizzas in multiples of entire pies and that you can have a choice in size of pie and type of toppings (made to order). A key selling point is that it is a relatively inexpensive way to feed a group of people. You win either by focusing on lowest price or best toppings. Yet this simple little item has spawned a wide variety of variations when one thinks outside of conventional wisdom.

Take Little Caesars Pizza. It decided to try to offer incredibly fast service with incredibly low prices, so it invented the Hot-n-Ready program. The selling point is that you can go to a Little Caesars and pick up as many pizzas as you want without calling ahead and pick them up immediately at $5 per pizza. How do they do it? They limit your choice to two pizzas—cheese or pepperoni—in one size (large). By limiting choice, they can make them in advance, so that there are always plenty ready to take home immediately at any time. So much for the conventional wisdom of selling choice and made-to-order. As it turns out, cheese and pepperoni are two of the most popular choices, and for many, the ability to avoid waiting 30 minutes to have it made to order. It also helps to keep the costs down.

Rocky Rococo’s (located primarily in Wisconsin) turns conventional wisdom upside down in another way. Rather than focusing on round pizza pies, its specialty is in making huge rectangular sheets. It then cuts them up into smaller single-portion rectangles and puts them into little cardboard boxes, just like McDonald’s sells a Big Mac. They break down the convention that you have to buy an entire pie, or that it has to be round. It is perfect for serving a single person (rather than a group). It is also great if everyone in the group wants a different flavor of pizza. It is far more convenient as a quick to-go purchase (grab a box and go). And, as in the case of Little Caesar’s, you can get your individual serving immediately because the big sheets are made in advance. Sbarro’s is similar, but sells pizza by the slice from a conventional round pizza.

Another variation on the theme is the pizza buffet—places like CiCi’s. Rather than selling pizza pies, one is basically selling the opportunity to fill a plate. You can eat different slices from different pizzas, so that you are not stuck with just one pizza flavor. If your group wants different pizza choices, this is the place. It’s all you can eat, so your money goes a long way.

Pizza buffets tend not to have the highest quality pizzas, so that they can keep the prices low. However, if price is not your main issue, you can step up the quality and the flavor by going someplace a little nicer, like California Pizza Kitchen. The flavors tend to be more exotic and sold primarily in preset topping combinations.

Of course, many pizza’s come from places that have no seating at all (a restaurant without the restaurant—just a kitchen and a door). You are expected to eat it at home. Why they will even deliver it to your door. This is the business model of Domino’s. And now, Domino’s is taking choice to a new level, offering not only a choice of toppings, but a choice of sauces (four choices) and a choice of crust flavors (choice of 2).

And then there are places like Papa Murphy’s which specialize in take-n-bake pizzas. They will prepare your pizza to order, but do not bake it. Instead, you take it home and bake it in your own oven. By eliminating the costs of ovens and delivery which places like Domino’s have, they can create a good pizza value. And this way, the customer has more control over the time when the pizza is ready. It will not have a chance to cool down during delivery before getting to the table.

And now, thanks to modern pizza technology, you can get pizzas in the frozen food section of the supermarket which claim to taste as good as take-out pizza.

Finally, let’s not forget places like Chuck E. Cheese which are primarily selling an entertainment experience. You pay money for the entire experience and somewhere in there you have also purchased a pizza. The pizza is not the main draw. It is almost an afterthought.

The point I am trying to make is that if you can invent this many strategies for selling a simple pizza, then just think of what you can do in other industries. Pizzas do not have to be round, do not have to be sold by the pie, do not have to be made-to-order, do not have to be baked, do not have to offer on-site seating, do not have to be the main attraction, and so on.

What are the conventions in your industry just waiting to be broken?

SUMMARY
Conventional wisdom about how to do business in an industry can block our minds from seeing alternatives. It’s hard to become a leader if you continue to follow the pack by imitating conventional wisdom. Greater profitability tends to come via differentiation. Find a way to be different by reinventing the rules of the game—rules at which you can win. Remember, there is more than one way to slice a pizza.

FINAL THOUGHTS
Leaders tend to like conventional wisdom, because they are the brand best associated with delivering on the expected conventions. Leaders also tend to like imitators to follow conventional wisdom, because it reinforces the fact that the leader is doing things the right way and that they are superior in delivering it. When other brands forge a new path, consumers see that the leader is not the best at all possibilities and it can weaken or narrow the appeal of their brand. Why should you give the leader what they want by accepting their definition of how it should be done?

Saturday, June 2, 2007

Theory of Business Relativity

THE STORY
One time I was making a presentation to the top executives of a large corporation. I suggested that they might want to consider the acquisition of a particular retail company. I felt that this company might provide a good opportunity for them if purchased, because:

1) It would quickly and efficiently provide the corporation with a new channel of distribution.

2) It could provide a foundation for a new transformational strategy—significantly different from what the current owners were doing with the assets, and unique for the marketplace. It was an opportunity to get in on the ground floor of a revolutionary new retail concept which required this type of distribution channel.

3) Because the transformational strategy had the potential for being copied, acquiring a company that already had a national presence would provide a platform for rapid expansion, in order to claim the market before anyone else.

4) Given that the company was not implementing this transformational strategy and instead had an old positioning in the marketplace that was fairly weak, one could probably attain the assets fairly inexpensively.

It turns out that these executives I made the presentation to apparently had selective hearing. They heard the part about this potentially being a good acquisition, but seemed to miss everything else.

Here’s what they did.

1) The bought the company, but paid an outrageous premium price for the privilege. At that price, it would be difficult to get an adequate return, even if everything went right.

2) They did not implement the transformational strategy. Instead, they continued operating a variation on the old, failing strategy of the prior owners.

3) Even though it was a different channel of distribution, requiring a different approach to operating the business, the acquiring firm tended to operate it too similarly to the channel of distribution they were more familiar with.

4) The reason proposed for buying the firm was to penetrate the national market quickly with the new concept. Instead, they moved very slowly with any sort of small movement in the direction of the transformation.

As a result, the acquisition was a disaster and was eventually sold to a hedge fund at a significant loss.

THE ANALOGY
Absolutes can create easier decision-making. If something is always good or always bad, then it is easy to know what to do. Unfortunately, the answer in the business world more often than not is not “it is bad” or “it is good”, but rather “it depends.”

Take the example in the story above. Was acquiring the business a good idea or a bad idea? The answer is “it depends.” If one pays too much for the business and does little to add value to it (as this company did), then the answer to the question is that the acquisition was a bad idea. However, if it had been purchased at a more reasonable price and had been used as a launching pad to create a new transformational strategy, then the acquisition would probably have been a good idea (it is hard to say, because this path was not taken).

Business strategies often include recommendations concerning the buying or selling of assets/companies. Whether or not these strategies are successful can often depend more on the manner in which the assets are acquired/disposed of than in the original idea of doing the buying or selling. Therefore, the process of strategy should not end once recommendations are made to buy or sell an asset. To prevent selective hearing, the voice of strategy needs to continue throughout the entire process, in order to ensure that the execution is consistent with the strategic intent.

THE PRINCIPLE
The principle here is the Theory of Business Relativity. The idea is that the concept of whether an asset is good or bad is not always absolute, but can vary depending on other factors. The two factors which most impact whether an asset is good or bad are:

1) Price; and
2) Use

These are discussed in more detail below.

1) Price
Whether something is of great value depends in part on the intrinsic value within the asset. For most business assets, the intrinsic value of an asset is determined by the value of the cash flows which the asset can create for the company which owns it. However, of equal importance is the price associated with obtaining that asset. If the price one pays for the asset is far less than the intrinsic value, than the asset is very good and valuable to the firm. However, if one pays far more than the intrinsic value, then one has destroyed value and purchased a “bad” asset.

In both cases, it is the same identical asset with the same identical intrinsic value. However, the price one pays for it determines whether that is a good value or a bad value.

This principle is easy to see in stock trading recommendations. There could be a great company out there with outstanding prospects for growth and profitability. However if the price of the stock in that company has been run up too high, it could be a bad stock to buy at the going price. Conversely, there could be a very weak company out there with low profit prospects, but if the stock is priced low enough, it could be a great value to buy the stock of this “weak” company. Good or bad is only partly determined by the strength and weakness of the company’s prospects. The rest is determined by the price it takes to participate in those prospects.

So when someone asks whether a particular company is good or bad, you can say that it depends. The good news is that since intrinsic value is only part of the equation, you can have greater control in determining its total value based on your negotiating skills. If you are highly skilled in this art, you can make almost anything a good value, regardless of its intrinsic value.

With this in mind, a good strategy must first research an asset to best determine its intrinsic value. Then it must participate in the negotiation to ensure that the price of the transaction is favorable relative to the intrinsic value.

2) Use
Depending on how an asset is used, it can have a different intrinsic value. For example, let’s assume that there are two identical factories—each owned by a different company. Each company paid the same price to obtain their factory. The first company uses its factory to make a very profitable product. The second company uses its factory to make a very unprofitable product. So is this factory a good asset or a bad asset? The answer is, “it depends,” based on how it is used.

In the hands of the first company, the factory is a very good asset. It provides profits far higher than the price paid for it, because of the way it is used. In the hands of the second company, the factory is a very bad asset. It provides losses, so that the company will never get a profitable return on the investment in the factory.

Intrinsic value varies based on how the asset is used. In the original story, I felt that the company in question could be purchased at a good value, because I believed I had a better use for the assets in question than the current owners. As a result, I could afford to acquire the assets for more than the intrinsic value perceived by the current owners, but less than the intrinsic value available with my transformation strategy. That could provide a win-win on the price.

Unfortunately, the company doing the acquiring in the story paid a price about equal to the transformational intrinsic value, yet operated the business at the older, lower intrinsic value.

Therefore, it is very important to understand the strategic intent for the asset at the time of the evaluation. In addition, it is important to make sure that the asset is used in a manner consistent with the strategy, in order to create the value upon which the strategy was based.

SUMMARY
The “goodness” or “badness” of an asset’s value is only partially due to the current intrinsic value in that asset. The greater determinant of good or bad has to do with one’s strategy regarding that asset—namely how much you are willing to pay for it, and how you are planning on using it to create cash flow.

The better one’s strategy and the better the follow-through in executing that strategy, the more likely the asset will be “good” in your hands.

FINAL THOUGHTS
I worked with an executive at a different company who would ask us to go off and determine the intrinsic value of a company. We’d come back and report to him what the intrinsic value was. His response would be, “Well, if that is what the company is worth, then that is what we should pay for it.” We’d then try to explain to him that if the price he pays is equal to its intrinsic value, then he has created zero value for the company. Value is only created if you pay less than what the asset can provide in cash flow.